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School District Liability 




School districts increasingly and controversially require 
students to use school-provided technology that tracks every 
sentence students write and every website students visit, 
whether from school or at home.1 Although the pedagogic 
advantages are many, the privacy concerns are profound 
given the pervasive information at the fingertips of teachers 
and school administrators.2 As students increasingly use the 
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 1. Alexandra Chachkevitch, Privacy Concerns Arise Over Monitoring 
Software, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Feb. 27, 2014), https://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
suburbs/glenview/ct-xpm-2014-02-27-ct-schools-monitoring-software-tl-n-
20140227-story.html. The software tracks students’ navigation as long as the 
student uses school-provided hardware or signs in through the school portal. 
 2. Frida Alim, Nate Cardozo, Gennie Gebhart, Karen Gullo & Amul Kalia, 
Spying on Students: School-Issued Devices and Student Privacy, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Apr. 13, 2017). Some parents have lashed back at the 
increased focus on online initiatives, fearing that their children use the Web 
excessively as it is. See, e.g., Nellie Bowles, Silicon Valley Came to Kansas 
Schools. That Started a Rebellion, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2019). 
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Internet,3 the most intimate details of their lives are exposed 
to school officials. 
Because of the vast information now at school 
administrators’ fingertips, schools have turned to technology 
companies to install software—termed safety management 
platforms (SMPs)—that alert school districts to risks of 
suicide or bullying.4 The software uses Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) to comb through a student’s word usage and online 
navigation to notify school administrators of concerns 
warranting intervention.5 Indeed, the third-party providers 
boast that their technology is essential to preventing 
violence.6 For instance, a leading SMP, Bark for Schools, 
recently asserted that its combination of technology and 
process had thwarted “16 plausible school shootings” in the 
preceding year.7 Another market leader, Gaggle, claims “to 
have stopped 447 deaths by suicide” between July 2018 and 
February 2019.8 Not surprisingly, school districts have 
flocked to adopt the technology. As of February 2019, 
 
 3. Marielle Gilbert, 4 Ways to Protect Kids from Cyberbulling, GOGUARDIAN 
BLOG (Oct. 2, 2017), https://blog.goguardian.com/4-ways-to-protect-kids-from-
cyberbullying. 
 4. Simone Stolzoff, Schools are Using AI to Track What Students Write on 
Their Computers, QUARTZ (Aug. 19, 2018), https://qz.com/1318758/schools-are-
using-ai-to-track-what-students-write-on-their-computers/. Some schools may 
adopt the technology as well in an effort to comply with the Children’s Internet 
Protection Act (CIPA), which requires schools and libraries to certify that they 
have an Internet safety policy that includes technology protection measures. The 
protection measures must block or filter access to pictures that are (a) obscene; 
(b) child pornography; or (c) harmful to minors. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See, e.g., Larry Magid, School Software Walks the Line Between Safety 
Monitor and “Parent Over the Shoulder,” FORBES (Apr. 14, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/larrymagid/2016/04/14/straddling-the-line-between 
-spying-and-protecting-students/#69847327df93 (reporting on GoGuardian’s 
assertions of prowess). 
 7. Edward C. Baig, Can Artificial Intelligence Prevent the Next Parkland 
Shooting?, USA TODAY (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/ 
2019/02/13/preventing-next-parkland-artificial-intelligence-may-help/ 
2801369002/. 
 8. Id. 
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approximately 4,500 school districts deploy one of three 
SMPs—Securly, Gaggle, and Bark for Schools.9 School 
districts rely on SMPs to keep students safe.10 
Lost in the shuffle has been the potential impact on 
school liability if a tragedy ensues. Traditionally, immunity 
doctrines under state law (and restrictive Section 1983 
jurisprudence under federal law) have protected school 
districts from liability in all but the most shocking cases. On 
the one hand, school districts will likely avoid liability if they 
follow the protocols suggested by the SMPs. On the other, 
however, school districts may be liable if they fail to act on 
the alerts provided by the third-party software provider, for 
that omission will likely be considered ministerial and open 
the schools to liability. Moreover, utilization of an SMP may 
lull students and their parents into taking fewer precautions. 
This might lead courts to hold school districts liable for 
failing to warn of dangers of which the districts should have 
been aware. Finally, as the efficacy of SMPs increases and 
the cost decreases, a public school might be liable for failing 
to use an SMP. 
Part I traces the development and functionality of the 
safety management platforms in question. Part II then 
canvasses the doctrines that have emerged exposing school 
districts to limited liability for failing to protect children. As 
the basis for liability has shifted from custody to special 
relationship between a school and its students, the scope of 
liability has broadened. In Part III, we argue that utilization 
of SMPs will protect school districts when they adhere to the 
warnings indicated by the SMP. But if a school district 
ignores the SMP’s alert, then the school district opens itself 
to liability because a failure to act on concrete alerts will be 
considered ministerial. And, as SMPs become the norm, a 
 
 9. Baig, supra note 7 (stating a combined total of approximately 2,000 school 
districts use Securly, 1,400 use Gaggle, and 1,100 use Bark for Schools). 
 10. Rebecca Sadwick, Why Aren’t Schools Doing More to Prevent Suicide?, 
FORBES (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rebeccasadwick/2015/09/ 
10/why-arent-schools-doing-more-to-prevent-suicide/#19fce02c4727. 
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failure to use an SMP may itself fall beneath a standard of 
reasonable care. Finally, in Part IV, we conclude that, for the 
most part, schools will escape liability for failing to 
sufficiently supervise the technology company utilizing the 
SMP, but schools should take care to treat such companies 
as independent contractors. 
I. FUNCTIONALITY OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT PLATFORMS 
Contemporary K-12 classroom technologies11 empower 
teachers to track a student’s academic progress on homework 
assignments and observe a student’s behavior online.12 Much 
of the software allows the school not only to monitor 
computer use at school, but also at home.13 
Given the potential intrusiveness of such software, 
schools have turned to Safety Management Platforms to 
monitor students’ online activity for suicidal behaviors, 
cyberbullying, and other threats of violence. To prevent such 
harm, SMPs typically use “natural-language processing to 
scan through the millions of words typed on . . . computers”—
school or personal—as long as the student uses school-
supplied hardware or signs in through the school portal.14 
When the technology flags a concerning word or phrase,  a 
team of human reviewers working on behalf of the 
technology companies evaluates the severity of the flagged 
 
 11. See, e.g., Ben Cahoon, Choosing the Right Classroom Management 
Software Solution, SOUTHEAST EDUCATION NETWORK (Mar. 21, 2011), 
https://www.seenmagazine.us/Articles/Article-Detail/articleid/1332/choosing-
the-right-classroom-management-software-solution. 
 12. See id. 
 13. Anya Kamenetz, Software Flags ‘Suicidal’ Students, Presenting Privacy 
Dilemma, NPRED (March 28, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2016/03/28/ 
470840270/when-school-installed-software-stops-a-suicide; Cody Walker, How 
Our District Uses Tech to Fight Cyberbullying, ESCHOOL NEWS (Oct. 18, 2018), 
https://www.eschoolnews.com/2018/10/18/how-our-district-uses-tech-to-fight-
cyberbullying. Impero Education Pro allows teachers and other school officials to 
go back and pull up screenshots and time stamped videos of students’ online 
activity, regardless of when that online activity occurred. 
 14. Stolzoff, supra note 4. 
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material.15 If the human reviewers determine that the 
indication meets certain requirements—requirements 
typically known only to the technology company itself—the 
company will alert school personnel.16 The functionality of 
different SMPs varies slightly,17 but this general approach 
remains the same across platforms. 
School districts typically work with the technology 
company to tailor the software to their specific needs—
selecting which words and phrases will be considered 
“language of harm.”18 For instance, gang nicknames vary 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, as does slang for particular 
drugs. Moreover, schools have experienced different 
histories, whether shootings or suicides, that should be 
factored in.19 Overall, SMPs are seen as a vital way of 
preventing harm before it happens, especially in an era in 
which school shootings, student suicides, bullying, and 
depression are on the rise.20 
A. Suicide Alerts 
SMPs that monitor for suicide ideation and planning 
 
 15. See id.; see also Bark for Schools, BARK, https://www.bark.us/schools. 
 16. See Stolzoff, supra note 4; see also Gaggle Safety Management, GAGGLE, 
https://www.gaggle.net/product/gaggle-safety-management/. 
 17. For example, platforms like Gaggle, Bark for Schools, and Securly use 
humans as a line of first review in determining which alerts merit sharing with 
school personnel, while platforms like GoGuardian, Beacon, and Social Sentinel 
rely only on the technology itself. See, e.g., Gaggle Safety Management, supra note 
16; see also Bark for Schools, supra note 15; 24 by Securly, SECURLY, 
https://www.securly.com/products/24; Go Guardian Beacon, GOGUARDIAN, 
https://www.goguardian.com/beacon.html; One Central Platform, SOCIAL 
SENTINEL, https://www.socialsentinel.com/one-central-platform/. 
 18. Lisa Mullins, To Detect Threats and Prevent Suicides, Schools Pay 
Company to Scan Social Media Posts, WBUR NEWS (March 22, 2018), 
https://www.wbur.org/news/2018/03/22/school-threats-suicide-prevention-tech. 
 19. See Eli Zimmerman, GoGuardian Develops a New AI-Enabled Cloud 
Filter for K-12 Schools, EDTECH MAGAZINE (Feb. 11, 2019), 
https://edtechmagazine.com/k12/article/2019/02/goguardian-develops-new-ai-
enabled-cloud-filter-k-12-schools. 
 20. Stolzoff, supra note 4.  
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advertise themselves as a response to the reality that suicide 
is now the second-leading cause of death among teenagers.21 
Since 2007, the suicide rate has increased thirty percent for 
boys and has doubled for girls ages fifteen to nineteen.22 
To provide one example, GoGuardian’s newest product, 
Beacon, alerts school officials and parents to students at risk 
of committing suicide.23 GoGuardian prides itself on having 
developed the K–12 software with mental health and suicide 
prevention experts, such as the American Foundation for 
Suicide Prevention and the American Association of 
Suicidology.24 Like other SMPs, Beacon scans for certain 
words, phrases, and content. Beacon relies on school districts 
to tailor the software to their specific needs,25 and school 
districts choose who gets the alerts and how alerts are 
created.26 
Although data from Beacon indicate that eighty percent 
of at-risk notifications were generated during school hours, 
the software does not stop at the classroom.27 Beacon 
conducts real-time scans across the entire internet and 
continues to scan even after the student goes home and uses 
a personal device.28 The software’s cloud-based capability 
allows it to scan all mobile and personal devices connected to 
 
 21. Brian Resnick, A Promising New Clue to Prevent Teen Suicide: Empower 
Adults Who Care, VOX (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/ 
2019/2/28/18234667/teen-suicide-prevention. 
 22. GoGuardian Announces Beacon, a Suicide and Self-Harm Prevention Tool 
for Schools, BUSINESS WIRE (August 27, 2018), https://www.businesswire.com/ 
news/home/20180827005160/en/GoGuardian-Announces-Beacon-Suicide-Self-
Harm-Prevention-Tool [hereinafter GoGuardian Announces Beacon].  
 23. GoGuardian, GoGuardian Launches New Suicide Prevention Technology 
Allowing Schools to Help At-Risk Students, AMERICAN FOUNDATION FOR SUICIDE 
PREVENTION, https://afsp.org/goguardian-launches-new-suicide-prevention-
technology-allowing-schools-to-help-at-risk-students/. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Kamenetz, supra note 13. 
 26. See GoGuardian Announces Beacon, supra note 22. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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school networks.29 The software also monitors chat, social 
media, and emails 24/7.30 The company advertises the 
benefits of expansive monitoring to permit schools to identify 
warning signs that other services might miss by scanning 
only school-provided devices.31 
Beacon also advertises that it has fewer false positives 
because the software separates the student’s online activity 
into “phases.”32 First, the software monitors students’ online 
activity and devices for behavior indicative of suicide 
ideation and self-harm.33 Second, the software creates an 
alert of concerning activity34 and notifies designated 
recipients, including school officials, parents and students.35 
The alerts can escalate until action is taken, and the alerts 
can occur at any time.36 The student can also be messaged 
directly with suicide help and prevention resources.37 
B. Bullying and Threats of Violence 
In addition to teen suicide, SMPs also address the 
nationwide concern for bullying in schools.38 Bullying ranks 
among the top worries of parents and students, and takes 
place in all schools.39 In 2017 alone, over thirteen million 
American children were bullied or cyberbullied.40 According 
 
 29. Zimmerman, supra note 19. 
 30. GoGuardian Announces Beacon, supra note 22. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See id. 
 38. Mary Ann Azevedo, New Apps Aim to Deter, Stop Bullying, CISCO: THE 
NETWORK (May 21, 2015), https://newsroom.cisco.com/feature-content?article 
Id=1630360. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Tina Meier, AI Technology Helps Protect Teens from Cyberbullying, IBM 
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to the National Center for Education Statistics, one out of 
every five children in grades six through twelve reported that 
they had been bullied,41 and the impact may be more 
severe.42 Along with its suicide prevention tools, GoGuardian 
has Smart Alert.43 Smart Alert monitors online behavior and 
alerts administrators when students are “victimized 
online.”44 Different software allows the alerts to be triggered 
when students use certain language online if a student is 
bullying another or if a student is being bullied.45 Once 
again, school districts can tailor the software to a school 
district’s specific needs.46 
Impero Education Pro incorporates monitoring software 
into its classroom management software.47 As do the other 
software providers, Impero identifies keywords and phrases 
that presage cyberbullying or threats of violence.48 The 
software then sends an alert to the proper staff when it 
detects a student typing those words or phrases, or even if 
the student accesses websites often used for cyberbullying or 
violence.49 The classroom management software allows 
school officials to identify students involved in the 
situation.50 The screen shots generated by the SMPs can also 
 
(Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/client-voices/ai-technology-protect-
teens-cyberbullying/. 
 41. Deborah Lessne & Christina Yanez, Student Reports of Bullying: Results 
from the 2015 School Crime Supplement to the National Crime Victimization 
Survery. Web Tables. NCES 2017-015, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION 
STATISTICS (Dec. 20, 2016), https://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid 
=2017015. 
 42. Ari E. Waldman, Tormented: Anti-Gay Bullying in Schools, 84 TEMP. L. 
REV. 385, 399 (2012). 
 43. Gilbert, supra note 3. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See id. 
 47. Walker, supra note 13. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
2019] AI GOES TO SCHOOL 1337 
be shared with the proper administrators, parents, and even 
authorities.51 
Social Sentinel is another one of the many technology 
companies that offer some form of social media scanning or 
monitoring.52 The software scans social media posts across 
dozens of social media platforms every day. Social Sentinel 
also works with mental health and public safety experts to 
build a “library” of possible harmful words and phrases for 
school districts to choose from.53 School districts principally 
deploy Social Sentinel to pick up threats of violence, but the 
software also scans social media posts for indications that a 
student might hurt him or herself.54 
Some software not only monitors for bullying and 
violence, but also prompts students to prevent such behavior. 
For example, Gaggle includes a feature called the SpeakUp 
Timeline, which allows students to report bullying, fights, 
threats of violence, and more.55 The email address for 
SpeakUp will automatically populate in the address box any 
time a student starts composing an email on G Suite or Office 
365.56 Trained officials then evaluate the reports to filter out 
false positives. School officials and law enforcement are 
contacted in emergency situations.57 Securly also features a 
Tipline, where students can send in anonymous tips that are 
later analyzed by professionals.58 
In short, SMPs utilize AI to identify students at risk of 
suicide, bullying and other violence. SMPs alert school 
administrators to the need to intervene to prevent the harm. 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Mullins, supra note 18. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. SpeakUp, GAGGLE, https://www.gaggle.net/product/safetytipline/. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. TipLine, SECURLY, https://www.securly.com/products/tipline. 
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II. SCHOOL DISTRICT DUTY TO PROTECT 
A. Custody Theory 
Courts have long imposed on schools a duty to protect 
students in their charge: “The duty owed derive[d] from the 
simple fact that a school, in assuming physical custody and 
control over its students, effectively takes the place of 
parents and guardians.”59 Given that schools have custody of 
students for at least part of the day, courts reasoned that 
schools must take care that no harm befell students for that 
period of custody. Just as schools had to ensure that students 
were not harmed by slippery floors or debris on stairs,60 they 
had a duty to protect the students from harm from others or 
their own employees on the premises.61 
At the same time, courts placed significant limitations 
on the school’s duty. As the New York court summarized in 
 
 59. Mirand v. City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d 44, 49 (1994). 
 60. Perkins v. Norwood City Schs., 707 N.E.2d 868, 870 (Ohio 1998); Cooper 
v. Smithtown Cent. Sch. Dists., 441 N.Y.S.2d 552, 553 (1981). 
 61. With respect to federal law, the custody question loomed large in a variety 
of civil rights lawsuits alleging that school districts’ failure to protect students 
violated the Due Process Clause. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department 
of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 198 (1989), the United States Supreme Court 
rejected a Section 1983 claim based on the social service department’s failure to 
intervene to protect plaintiff’s son from serious abuse by the custodial father. The 
Court recognized the gravity of the harm but held that the government’s failure 
to protect against private violence does not constitute a denial of due process 
unless the state exercised custody over the individual or somehow had created or 
amplified the risk. Id. at 202. Liability, however, can arise if state actors have 
near total custody of individuals, as in a prison or orphanage, or when the state 
actors themselves caused the peril. Id. at 200. To the Court, custody was the 
lynchpin, not a special relationship per se. Id. at 201. Following DeShaney, the 
Seventh Circuit in J.O. Alton Community Unit School District, 909 F.2d 267, 272 
(7th Cir. 1990), held that the limited custody exercised by the school did not 
create an affirmative duty to protect, and the Third Circuit held similarly in D.R. 
v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, 972 F.2d 1364, 1371 (3d Cir. 
1992). According to the Third Circuit, “parents remain the primary caretakers, 
despite [students’] presence in school.” D.R., 972 F.2d at 1371. State attendance 
laws were insufficient to impose such a duty upon the schools. Parents could 
remove the children from school or talk to their students about taking steps at 
school to avert the harm. Id.  
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Carabello v. New York City Dept. of Educ.,62 “the imposition 
of this duty d[id] not make schools insurers of the safety of 
their students, ‘for they [could not] be reasonably expected to 
continuously supervise and control all movements and 
activities of students.’”63 Because schools cannot ensure the 
safety of students in the hallways, locker room, and in the 
school yard, courts generally administered a heightened 
foreseeability standard before they imposed liability in the 
school context for harm at the hands of others—whether 
students, teachers, or staff. This heightened standard 
required the school to possess “sufficiently specific 
knowledge or [actual or constructive] notice of the dangerous 
conduct which caused the injury; that is, that the third-party 
acts could reasonably have been anticipated.”64 And, the 
custodial origin of a school’s historical duty—the duty’s 
foundation, for lack of a better term—led courts to limit 
school liability to foreseeable injuries that occurred on school 
premises. Unless the school released the student into “a 
potentially hazardous situation, particularly when the 
hazard [was] partly of the school district’s own making,” the 
school’s duty ended when the school relinquished custody of 
the student.65 
To illustrate these limitations, consider the New York 
Court of Appeals’ decision in Stephenson v. City of New 
York.66 There, two eighth-grade students were suspended 
 
 62. 928 F. Supp. 2d 627 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 63. Id. at 646. 
 64. Mirand, 84 N.Y.2d at 49. Under a different formulation of the same 
concept, Wisconsin courts hold that no immunity exists where “public officers or 
employees” breach “ministerial duties” that arise from “known and compelling 
dangers.” Voss ex rel. Harrison v. Elkhorn Area Sch. Dist., 724 N.W.2d 420, 423 
(Wisc. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). 
 65. Ernest v. Red Creek Cent. Sch. Dist., 93 N.Y.2d 664, 671 (1999); see also 
Pratt v. Robinson, 39 N.Y.2d 554, 560 (1976) (“When [the school’s] custody ceases 
because the child has passed out of the orbit of its authority in such a way that 
the parent is perfectly free to reassume control over the child’s protection, the 
school’s custodial duty also ceases.”). 
 66. 19 N.Y.3d 1031, 1032 (2012). 
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from school for their involvement in an altercation at school 
on October 22.67 Two days later, on October 24th, one of the 
students assaulted the other student two blocks from the 
school prior to school hours.68 The assaulted student’s 
mother sued school officials, alleging that school officials 
failed to ensure the student’s safety during the October 24th 
assault.69 The defendant school officials then moved to 
dismiss the claim, arguing that school officials owed no duty 
related to the second altercation because the altercation took 
place before school hours and off school property.70 After the 
lower court originally denied the school officials’ motion, New 
York’s highest court affirmed the Appellate Division’s 
decision to dismiss the case.71 The court found that “the 
school addressed the [first] altercation that occurred on 
school property . . . by punishing the students” and that the 
second altercation “was out of the orbit of the school’s 
authority, as the incident occurred away from the school and 
before school hours where there was no teacher 
supervision.”72 
Similarly, in Matallana v. School Board of Miami-Dade 
County,73 the Florida court held that a school could not be 
responsible for violence outside school premises. The 
decedent informed the school guard that someone wanted to 
fight him, and soon after the student left school, he was 
attacked and tragically died. Even though the security guard 
breached protocol by failing to report the information, the 
court reiterated that “a school’s obligation of reasonable 
 
 67. Id. at 1033. 
 68. Id. at 1032.  
 69. Id. at 1033. See also Searcy v. Hemet Unified Sch. Dist., 223 Cal. Rptr. 
206, 213 (1986) (finding that school responsibility ends “when a student had 
departed homeward after school hours”). 
 70. Stephenson, 19 N.Y.3d at 1033. 
 71. Id. at 1033. 
 72. Id. at 1034.  
 73. 838 So.2d 1191, 1192 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
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supervision must come to an end and the parent or 
guardian’s duty of supervision must resume . . . when the 
student leaves the school’s premises during non-school hours 
and is no longer involved in school-related activities.”74 The 
custody theory of liability prevailed.75 
Even when an injury occurs on school premises, state law 
immunity poses a high hurdle for those challenging 
supervision and other discretionary acts by public schools. 
Some of the immunity is statutory, and some is based on 
common law.76 Although immunity doctrines vary, the 
doctrine typically immunizes school districts from liability 
for discretionary actions—actions “involving the exercise of 
discretion and judgment, or personal deliberation, decision, 
and judgment.”77 However, schools can still be held 
accountable for injuries stemming from ministerial acts—
actions “requiring only obedience to the orders of others, or 
when the officer’s duty is absolute, certain and imperative, 
involving merely execution of a specific act arising from fixed 
and designated facts.”78 And schools may be held liable even 
for discretionary actions if those actions reflect willful and 
wanton conduct. But, for judgment calls, the public 
immunity doctrine blocks liability. As the court summarized 
in Coe v. Board of Educ. of Town of Watertown,79 “[t]he 
 
 74. Id. (citation omitted). 
 75. See also Colette v. Tolleson Unified Sch. Dist. No. 21, 54 P.3d 828, 832 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (holding school not liable for crash involving students during 
school hours even though school officials were negligent in allowing students to 
leave the school). 
 76. See Peter J. Maher et al., Governmental and Official Immunity for School 
Districts and Their Employees: Alive & Well?, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 234, 
242–43 (2010) (assessing immunity state by state and concluding that some form 
of immunity exists in all states); see also KERN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID 
ALEXANDER, AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 531–35 (Chris Thillen ed., 3d ed. 
1992).   
 77. James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 905 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002) (quotations 
removed); see also Coe v. Bd. of Educ., 19 A.3d 640, 643 (Conn. 2011).  
 78. James, 95 S.W.3d at 905 (quotations removed). 
 79. 19 A.3d at 643. 
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hallmark of a discretionary act is that it requires the exercise 
of judgment . . . . In contrast, [m]inisterial refers to a duty 
which is to be performed in a prescribed manner without the 
exercise of judgment or discretion.”80 In short, the judgment 
of school administrators as to when students should be 
protected from themselves or others is highly discretionary—
teachers and school administrators are not experts in 
preventing violence to others or selves, and their 
determinations as to whether and how to intervene if 
threatening behavior comes to their attention has been 
considered discretionary. 
As an example, consider Brandy B. v. Eden Central 
School District.81 There, the mother of a five-year-old girl 
sued the girl’s school district after an eleven-year-old boy 
sexually assaulted the girl on a school bus.82 The plaintiff 
mother alleged inadequate supervision against the 
defendant school district.83 In support of the claim, the 
plaintiff produced evidence of the boy’s “troubling history” of 
“‘verbal aggression, aggression towards himself and others, 
threats with weapons, fire setting, hyperactivity, 
impulsivity, auditory hallucinations, history of stealing, 
temper tantrums, poor peer relations, academic problems, 
and history of suicidal injurious ideations.’”84 The plaintiff 
had even complained to the school bus driver about the boy 
after receiving “some notice . . . of inappropriate interactions 
between the two children.”85 Faced with this evidence, the 
court nonetheless held that “the alleged sexual assault . . . 
was an unforeseeable act that, without sufficiently specific 
knowledge or notice, could not have been reasonably 
 
 80. Id.  
 81. 934 N.E.2d 304, 305 (N.Y. 2010). 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. at 306.  
 84. Id. at 305.  
 85. Id. at 306.  
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anticipated by the school district.”86 Thus, despite the boy’s 
behavioral history and the mother’s previous complaints, the 
court determined that the decision whether to take 
protective measures remained in the school’s discretion.87 
B. Special Relationship 
Although the custody framework does not trigger a 
general duty to protect, courts more recently have focused on 
whether the school’s special relationship to students itself 
triggered a broader duty to protect. Indeed, in a separate 
common law context, the California Supreme Court in 
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California88 famously 
held that a therapist with knowledge that a patient was 
likely to injure someone had a “duty to warn” the victim and 
could be sued in negligence for such failure. The duty flowed 
from the special relationship between therapist and patient. 
The therapist need not be omniscient, but must exercise a 
reasonable degree of skill in forecasting violence and 
determining when to warn specific victims. 
Some jurisdictions have applied Tarasoff explicitly to 
schools. For example, in Phyllis P. v. Superior Court,89 the 
court applied Tarasoff to the school setting, holding that the 
school had a duty to inform a student’s mother that the 
student had been molested at school. The student 
subsequently was raped, and the mother sued for the school’s 
failure to warn of that danger. Custody was not the lynchpin, 
but rather the unique relationship between school and 
student. 
Typically, courts have held that the schools’ “special 
 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. at 307; see also Pichler v. United States Fire Ins. Co., No. 98-1337, 
1999 Wisc. App. LEXIS 754 at *6 (holding that only if “the danger is so clear and 
the solution so evident that the officer’s obligation admits but one immediate 
course” would immunity be defeated). 
 88. 551 P.2d 334, 343–44 (Cal. 1976). 
 89. 228 Cal. Rptr. 776, 777 (Ct. App. 1986).  
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relationship” to students requires a duty to protect without 
citing Tarasoff. For instance, the Supreme Court of Kentucky 
in Williams v. Kentucky Department of Education90 reflected 
that “the ‘special relationship’ thus formed between a school 
district and its students imposes an affirmative duty on the 
district, its faculty, and its administrators to take all 
reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable harm to its 
students.”91 Similarly, the Maryland Court of Appeals in 
Eisel v. Board of Education92 held that a school with specific 
knowledge of a student’s suicidal impulses could be liable 
despite the fact that the suicide took place in the student’s 
home. Even when the harm arises off site, the school can still 
be liable because of the special relationship.93 
Although some courts have not been explicit as to 
whether liability is based on the custody or the special 
relationship theory, the difference can be palpable. The 
custody theory focuses on liability for acts at school, whether 
in the classroom, at the gym, or in a bathroom. In contrast, 
liability under the special relationship theory is potentially 
far broader, for it is not limited by geography, as the court in 
Eisel determined. 
C. Affirmative Act 
Courts have held that, even when no duty to protect 
arises through the custody or special relationship theories, 
liability can exist if the plaintiff relied on the defendant’s 
affirmative act, or if the defendant’s conduct makes the risk 
 
 90. 113 S.W.3d 145 (Ky. 2003). 
 91. Id. at 148. See, e.g., Beshears v. Unified Sch. Dist. 305, 930 P.2d 1376, 
1383 (Kan. 1997); Munn v. Hotchkiss Sch., 165 A.3d 1167, 1173 (Conn. 2017); 
Murray v. Hudson, 34 N.E.3d 728, 733 (Mass. 2015); Hendrickson v. Moses Lake 
Sch. Dist., 398 P.3d 1199, 1200 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). 
 92. 597 A.2d 447, 450 (Md. 1991). 
 93. “[A] school district may owe a duty to its students, despite the fact that 
injury occurred off of school grounds and outside of school hours.” Stoddart v. 
Pocatello Sch. Dist., 239 P.3d 784, 789 (Idaho 2010) (citing Brooks v. Logan, 903 
P.2d 73 (Idaho 1995)). 
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of harm worse.94 With respect to reliance, the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts explains that one who provides for the 
protection of another is subject to liability for physical harm 
resulting from a failure to exercise reasonable care if “the 
harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the 
undertaking.”95 In Florence v. Goldberg,96 for example, a 
police department voluntarily assigned an individual to help 
students cross at a dangerous intersection. Plaintiff walked 
her child to the intersection and was reassured that the 
police were continuously helping. When the police guard was 
ill, the police department failed to notify the school, and an 
accident occurred at the intersection injuring the child.97 The 
student’s mother sued, and the court concluded that a suit 
could proceed because she had relied on the officer’s help and 
therefore had not herself accompanied her child through the 
intersection.98 
Similarly, in Jefferson County School District v. Justus,99 
the court refused to dismiss a challenge predicated on the 
school’s allegedly negligent efforts to ensure the safety of 
first graders. The school had prohibited first graders from 
riding bicycles to school, disseminated such information to 
parents, and evidently posted faculty at the front of the 
school to enforce the rule.100 A car collided with plaintiff’s son 
while he was riding a bicycle home from school.101 The court 
held that, through the communications with parents and the 
 
 94. Chisolm v. Stephens, 365 N.E.2d 80, 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); see also Sculles 
v. Am. Envtl. Prods., Inc., 592 N.E.2d 271, 274 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). 
 95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (Am. Law Inst. 1965). 
 96. 375 N.E.2d 763, 765 (N.Y. 1978). 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. See also Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348, 359 (11th 
Cir. 1989) (holding that prison officials had a special duty to defendant injured 
by member of inmate work squad); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 596 (9th 
Cir. 1989). 
 99. 725 P.2d 767, 773 (Colo. 1986). 
 100. Id. at 768.  
 101. Id.  
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posting of teachers, the school may have induced the parents 
of the first grader to rely on those protections.102 Thus, the 
school could be liable for negligence in allowing the son to 
bicycle home.103 
With respect to the risk of increased harm, a school may 
be liable if it carelessly gives a warning that increases the 
level of existing risk. Consider the Section 1983 action in 
Armijo v. Wagon Mound Public Schools.104 Plaintiff argued 
that the school authorities increased the risk of harm to a 
suicidal student.105 School officials suspended and sent the 
student home without complying with the school’s policy of 
notifying his parents.106 School administrators evidently also 
knew that the student had access to guns in the house.107 The 
Tenth Circuit determined that, if the plaintiff could 
demonstrate that the school’s handling of the disciplinary 
issue augmented the likelihood of harm, the Due Process suit 
could proceed.108 Whether on or outside the school’s 
premises, liability may arise if the school administrators’ 
conduct heightens the risk, as in Armijo.109 
To summarize, courts have imposed liability on schools 
for failing to protect their students under three rationales: 
custody, special relationship and affirmative acts 
undertaken to protect those students. Although liability 
historically was reserved for injuries occurring only on the 
premises, the special relationship and affirmative act 
 
 102. Id. at 773.  
 103. Id.; see also Wright-Young v. Chicago State Univ., No. 1-18-1073, 2019 
WL 4738855, at 13–14 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019) (affirming jury verdict against school 
board and finding that school board voluntarily assumed duty “to make future 
sporting events safer for students” after principal sent letter to parents assuring 
them that additional security precautions would be taken at future games). 
 104. 159 F.3d 1253, 1257 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 105. Id. at 1262.  
 106. Id. at 1257.  
 107. Id. at 1264.  
 108. Id.  
 109. Id.  
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theories expanded liability to include at least some injuries 
off premises. 
III. IMPACT OF SMPS ON SCHOOL DISTRICT LIABILITY 
Adoption of SMPs may alter the liability of school 
districts in several ways—at least in those school districts in 
which a special relationship/duty to protect theory is viable. 
Perhaps most dramatically, adoption of an SMP reflects a 
good faith effort by school districts to protect the interests of 
their students. Accordingly, school districts should escape 
liability for any harm that ensues when following the steps 
indicated by the SMP—whether those steps counsel for 
intervention or not. 
At the same time, reliance on SMPs may increase school 
district liability in more narrow contexts. First, a failure to 
follow through on SMP alerts likely will be deemed 
ministerial and therefore open school districts to liability in 
most jurisdictions. Although the school administrators in the 
absence of the SMP perhaps would not have alerted parents 
to possible harm, it is far more difficult to defend a failure to 
warn when the SMP protocols indicate that further action 
was due. Related, the school districts’ duty to warn likely will 
extend to the home and even to when school is not in session, 
as long as information flowing through the SMP signals that 
a warning is required. Second, because school districts 
arguably induce reliance on the safety measures undertaken 
through SMPs, plaintiffs may more readily argue that the 
school districts breached a duty of care when violence occurs 
even if an SMP has not issued an alert. By affirmatively 
adopting an SMP, a school district arguably lowers the 
vigilance of parents and their children who rely upon SMPs 
for protection. And, if the school heightens the risk of harm 
by mishandling the warning, liability for negligence can 
attach as well. Third, at some point in the future, school 
districts might be found liable for not adopting an SMP given 
the considerable benefits that can be gained. Unless the 
district can show it chose not to utilize an SMP for policy 
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reasons, its failure to act may reflect the kind of ministerial 
negligence that will defeat immunity. 
A. SMPs as a Defense 
In essence, school districts outsource digital monitoring 
to SMPs. That delegation reflects a proactive step that school 
districts have taken to help prevent their students from 
coming to harm. In light of the SMPs’ credible assertions of 
efficacy, any claim of negligence for failing to warn arising 
from information within the domain of the SMP that did not 
result in an alert readily should be dismissed. School 
districts act reasonably in utilizing SMPs to prevent harm to 
those in their charge. 
When professionals follow the standard of reasonable 
care in their profession or exceed that standard, courts 
generally accept such evidence as persuasive against claims 
of negligence. In the malpractice context, for instance, 
physicians escape liability if they follow standards in their 
profession, and when they adopt prevailing technology, they 
generally are protected as well.110 When educational 
professionals adopt state of the art technology and follow the 
protocols indicated, they should escape liability. In Brandy 
B,111 for example, if the SMP had not indicated that an alert 
was needed, the school should have prevailed at the 
summary judgment stage. 
To be sure, some claims may still arise outside the SMP 
system. Schoolmates may come directly to administrators or 
teachers with concern for suicidal tendencies or planned 
 
 110. See, e.g., Theodore Silver, One Hundred Years of Harmful Error: The 
Historical Jurisprudence of Medical Malpractice, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1193, 1212 
(1992) (explaining that courts have shielded physicians from liability when 
conforming to standard practices); see also Michael D. Greenberg, Medical 
Malpractice and New Devices: Defining an Elusive Standard, 19 HEALTH MATRIX 
423, 428–34 (2009) (noting that courts have precluded recovery for malpractice 
in most jurisdictions if physicians follow prevailing standards, including tech-
enabled practices). 
 111. Supra note 81.  
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gang fights. In Matallana,112 the danger was communicated 
to the security guard directly and not via emails or chat 
rooms. Similarly, in Colette,113 there undoubtedly was 
negligence, but use of the SMP would not have detected any 
information calling for an alert. School districts may be found 
liable in those contexts for failing to respond adequately. 
But, if the information flows through the SMP and the SMP 
does not call for an alert, no liability should exist. 
B. Loss of Immunity for Failure to Communicate Alert 
On the other hand, introduction of SMPs may open 
schools to liability for converting what before was a 
discretionary duty to warn to a ministerial act if dictated by 
the SMP algorithm.114 School administrators previously had 
to reach the complex decision of whether to warn and how to 
warn given the context-specific facts. Judgment ruled, and 
courts were loath to intrude upon that judgment, frequently 
ruling that immunity precluded suit. But, for matters 
covered by SMPs, school district responses become less 
discretionary—either the SMP analytics call for a warning or 
not. Once the SMP places the information in the school’s 
hands, school administrators must respond. Thus, school 
districts must communicate alerts dictated by the SMP or 
face the loss of immunity. 
Moreover, particularly in light of the breadth of the 
information channeled through the SMP, the duty to protect 
likely will not be confined to a school’s premises, as it has 
largely been in the past. Information gleaned from emails or 
Facebook are not confined to the school setting. As in Eisel, 
schools increasingly will be required to intervene to prevent 
harm wherever it occurs, as long as the information concerns 
a student and addresses a relatively specific harm. The SMP 
extends the special relationship between school and student 
 
 112. Supra note 73. 
 113. Supra note 75. 
 114. The duty to warn is an aspect, of course, of the school’s duty to protect. 
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because it places so much more information in the 
administrators’ possession. 
Return to the fact pattern in Stephenson.115  If the SMP 
had detected the animosity between the two boys and 
concern for an assault became heightened, a school’s failure 
to heed the alert may have opened the school district to 
liability for injuries even blocks away from the school. A 
school cannot turn a blind eye to credible information that 
harm is imminent. 
Indeed, experience under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA)116 bolsters the view that failure to comply with an 
alert from an SMP will expose a school district to liability. In 
partially waiving the federal government’s immunity from 
tort actions, Congress precluded recovery for challenges to 
governmental acts that were “based upon the exercise or 
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function or duty.”117 The Supreme Court’s 
construction of the discretionary function exception has 
varied over the years, but it has fashioned a number of tests 
to distinguish planning level or policy decisions that are 
covered by the exception from operational or ministerial 
actions that are not.118 The current doctrine, espoused in 
United States v. Gaubert,119 establishes a two-part test to 
determine which federal governmental actions are exempt 
from suit. The Court provided that only those governmental 
actions that stem from acts grounded in “social, economic or 
political” policies fall within the exception, and only then if 
the governing rules and regulations left the government 
actor with a choice.120 
 
 115. Supra note 66. 
 116. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (2012).  
 117. Id. § 2680. 
 118. See, e.g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 35–36 (1953); see also 
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 67–68 (1955). 
 119. 499 U.S. 315, 321–23 (1991). 
 120. Id. at 323. 
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As applied to the failure to protect context, courts have 
held that, if the federal government actor’s failure stems 
from oversight or inattention, the discretionary function 
exception does not apply. But if the failure stems from an 
economic or social decision, then liability will not attach. For 
instance, in Rich v. United States, the question raised was 
whether the federal government should have warned of a 
dangerous intersection instead of relying on a guardrail.121 
Given that the decision as to what kind of warning to give 
stemmed from social and economic policy, the court held the 
discretionary function exception was applicable.122 But, if 
plaintiff had been able to show that the government knew of 
the danger and simply failed to act, liability could have 
followed. 123 Indeed, in Cope v. Scott, the D.C. Circuit went 
further and stated that, although the decision whether to 
warn itself was discretionary, the decision on how to 
implement the warning did not involve the type of discretion 
protected by the exception because the implementation 
decision was technical as opposed to being steeped in 
policy.124 
Viewed with the lens borrowed from the FTCA, school 
districts’ utilization of SMPs eliminates much of the 
discretion that the administrators otherwise would exercise 
when reviewing online writing or postings. The school’s 
implementation of the SMP in effect has delegated that 
judgment or expertise to the AI program. As such, school 
districts would be hard-pressed to argue that they retained 
discretion to deviate from the recommended alerts and, 
accordingly, any such deviation could subject the school to 
liability. Indeed, the reasoning in Cope and similar cases 
leaves open the argument that the school’s ineffective 
 
 121. 119 F.3d 447, 449 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 122. Id. at 451–52. 
 123. See, e.g., Burns v. Gagnon, 727 S.E.2d 634, 643–44 (Va. 2012) (holding the 
jury could determine that administrator’s silence after being given warning of 
imminent attack was actionable). 
 124. 45 F.3d 445, 451–52 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
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conveyance of a warning might itself be actionable if the 
manner of the warning failed to communicate the risk 
successfully, and did not involve any policy considerations. 
There undoubtedly is an anomaly that arises from 
imposing liability on a school district after it adopts an SMP. 
School districts that eschew the technology learn fewer of the 
dangers their students face and, yet, paradoxically are less 
likely to be held liable as long as they act whenever receiving 
specific evidence of a threat. In contrast, with the 
introduction of SMPs, schools will have far more intimate 
knowledge of students’ lives and far more responsibility to 
warn of potential harm, whether on or outside school 
premises. With greater knowledge comes greater 
responsibility. But, the paradox seems less jarring given that 
school districts can also defend themselves by relying on the 
SMP as a shield to deflect liability whenever the protocols 
are followed. 
To minimize the potential for liability, school districts 
should make a record each time they disagree with the alert 
suggested by the SMP, and briefly indicate the reasons for 
withholding the alert. In that way, school districts can lessen 
the potential for liability, despite the disregard for the SMP 
alert.125 Moreover, communicating alerts to parents or 
guardians of any suicidal tendencies should absolve the 
school of any liability. The parents have primary 
responsibility for seeking treatment and care once the alert 
has been given. School districts, therefore, should err on the 
side of alerting parents in any close case. But, when the 
threat of harm comes from another student or a staff 
member, no such alerts are possible. 
 
 125. Liability for failure to provide necessary information to the SMP raises 
another potential problem. If the failure to supply needed background to the SMP 
can be linked to the failure to alert, the school district can defend on the ground 
that no clear parameters for when to furnish the information were given. On the 
other hand, if the failure to communicate adequately with the SMP stems from a 
ministerial failure, liability may attach. 
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C. Affirmative Act 
Finally, there is some risk that a school district’s 
affirmative act in adopting an SMP may induce reliance and 
lead to a finding of a more pervasive duty to protect than now 
governs. As discussed,126 any affirmative acts taken to 
protect students may trigger negligence liability if they 
induce reliance, as in the Florence and Jefferson County 
cases. Utilization of SMPs may enhance that risk. 
Schools utilize SMPs to identify signs of bullying, self-
harm, suicide, and school violence.127 The technology 
providers themselves say they do so to protect students from 
these harms.128 And schools then publicly advertise student 
protection as a reason for implementing the SMPs.129 Indeed, 
the more that SMPs tout their efficacy, the more that they 
may dampen the watchfulness that parents otherwise would 
exert. Schools utilizing SMPs may not detect every potential 
risk; but those schools can still monitor exponentially more 
than previously. 
Thus, considering the purpose of SMPs, the manner in 
which technology providers advertise them, and the reasons 
schools offer for implementing them, it becomes difficult to 
envision the implementation of an SMP as anything other 
than an affirmative action taken to protect. 
Given that students and their parents know of the SMP 
utilization, they arguably become less likely to take steps to 
 
 126. See supra Part II.C (discussing the Florence and Jefferson County cases). 
 127. See Benjamin Herold, Schools Are Deploying Massive Digital Surveillance 
Systems. The Results Are Alarming, EDUCATION WEEK (May 30, 2019), 
https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2019/05/30/schools-are-deploying-massive-
digital-surveillance-systems.html. 
 128. Id. (quoting technology provider executives regarding a school’s need to 
protect its students by implementing an SMP). 
 129. Charlotte Andrist, Nearly 1,200 School Districts Renew Partnerships with 
Gaggle, PRWEB (May 16, 2019), https://www.prweb.com/releases/nearly 
_1_200_school_districts_renew_partnerships_with_gaggle/prweb16315062.htm 
(quoting the Denver Public Schools’ Director of Emergency Management as 
saying that the district relies on its use of an SMP to keep students safe). 
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ensure student safety. When students know they are subject 
to continuous surveillance at young ages, they may come to 
anticipate that someone is always watching. For example, 
some students may assume that, if they write a call for help 
on their laptop, a school official will intervene. Although 
SMPs may detect much of this behavior, the technology 
cannot be expected to detect everything; nor can schools 
respond effectively in every situation in which the technology 
does detect a warning sign. If harm to the student then 
occurs, the affirmative act doctrine provides a basis upon 
which a plaintiff might argue for school liability. As a result, 
schools should be mindful that some students may assume 
that someone is always ready and able to help. 
In utilizing SMPs, therefore, school districts should take 
care not to tout the capacity of SMPs too expansively. The 
more that school districts reassure students and their 
parents that they can prevent harm before it happens, the 
more they may unintentionally encourage overreliance on 
the monitoring system. Harm can befall students that the 
SMPs cannot detect and prevent, and schools may not 
respond effectively in the eyes of a jury. The risk is that 
students and their parents will take fewer precautions in 
light of operation of the SMPs. Therefore, to avoid liability, 
school districts should stress that SMPs remain just a tool to 
oversee the safety of their charges, and that it is up to 
children and their parents to remain vigilant at all times. 
D. Failure to Adopt an SMP 
At first blush, it stretches credulity to argue that a school 
district’s failure to adopt an SMP can itself open a school 
district to liability. After all, a district’s decision whether to 
adopt an SMP stems from economic and social decision-
making, taking into account factors such as expense, efficacy, 
and privacy. 
Yet, if SMPs prove as successful as advertised, districts 
that furnish computers and use management software to 
monitor student writing will become increasingly hard-
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pressed to justify not utilizing SMPs. Plaintiffs may argue 
that the failure to take such a step, in the face of the efficacy 
of an SMP, demonstrates deliberate indifference to the safety 
of pupils in their charge.130 
Consider the example of smoke detectors or smoke 
alarms in homes. Over one hundred years ago, individuals 
faced a small chance of survival if their home caught fire.131 
With the invention of smoke detectors, the chance of survival 
grew. The first smoke detectors were extremely expensive.132 
And they still had to be improved to the point at which people 
could reasonably rely on them to alert to a fire. 
Today, however, a failure to install a smoke alarm may 
be evidence of negligence. For example, in the Ohio case of 
Starost v. Bradley,133 plaintiff filed suit alleging negligence 
for failure to install smoke detectors after being seriously 
injured in a fire.134 The court noted that “installation of 
smoke detector alarms in buildings creates an inference that 
the alarms will diminish the risk of harm to persons . . . 
because the alarm is designed and intended to warn them of 
the fire in its early stages.”135 Based in part on that finding, 
the court concluded that the failure to install a smoke alarm 
was a permissible factor for a jury to consider in determining 
liability, even if the failure may not have been negligence per 
 
 130. Indeed, the Minnesota Appellate Court in S.W. v. Spring Lake Park 
School District No. 16, 580 N.W.2d 19, 23 (Minn. 1998), held that a school 
district’s failure to adopt a security policy is not entitled to immunity unless the 
court is convinced that the lack of a policy was intended to enhance security—
“were we to hold that the simple absence of a policy or a decision not to have a 
policy entitles government entities to immunity under the statute, we would be 
providing government decisionmakers an incentive to avoid making the difficult 
decisions which the statute was designed to protect.” Id.  
 131. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SMOKE ALARMS, http://www.mysmokealarm.org/ 
history-of-smoke-alarms/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2019).  
 132. Id. 
 133. No. 17319, 1999 WL 41897, at *1 (Ohio App. 2d 1999). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at *5. 
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se.136 
A more recent example involves the steps needed to 
protect the integrity of data stored online. In the early days 
of the internet, businesses could not be found negligent for 
failing to install anti-virus, anti-malware, or any protective 
software on their websites. Now, one can search for 
protective software on the internet, and pages of providers 
with costs and guarantees pop up. Within a decade, the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) moved to fine companies 
for failing to install protective software to protect against 
data hacking.137 In F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide 
Corporation, the agency brought an action against 
defendants for “failure to maintain reasonable and 
appropriate data security for consumers’ sensitive personal 
information,” which the agency contended was in violation of 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.138 
Specifically, defendant failed to monitor its computer 
network for malware.139 Even though defendant argued that 
it had no notice of what the FTC deemed to be reasonable 
and appropriate data security, the court upheld the FTC’s 
determination.140 The Third Circuit affirmed the trial court’s 
decision, adding that defendant “failed to use any firewall at 
critical network points, did not restrict specific IP addresses 
at all, [and] did not use any encryption for certain customer 
files.”141 Private suits have been filed on comparable 
 
 136. Id. at *5–6. 
 137. See, e.g., Complaint at ¶ 7, 9–10, In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, 2005 WL 
1541551 (F.T.C. 2005) (No. 042-3160). 
 138. 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 607 (D.N.J. 2014) (quoting First Amended Complaint 
for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at ¶¶ 1, 44–49, Wyndham Worldwide 
Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602 (No. 13-1877(ES))). 
 139. Id. at 629. 
 140. Id. at 616, 636. 
 141. F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 79 F.3d 236, 256 (3d Cir. 2015). The 
FTC also issued a guidebook, which describes certain practices that form a sound 
data security plan, though no particular practice is necessarily required. FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING PERSONAL INFORMATION: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS 
(2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-0136_ 
2019] AI GOES TO SCHOOL 1357 
theories, as in the massive Anthem data breach case.142 
Much more quickly than in the smoke alarm context, 
technology developed that became an essential part of the 
duty to protect. 
The examples above illustrate how the invention of new 
technology can change safety requirements and the duty to 
protect in various contexts. They also show that the change 
in protective measures is typically not immediate due to 
factors such as cost, reliability, and development. Yet, as 
SMPs become the norm, plaintiffs may argue in the future 
that a school district’s failure to adopt comparable protective 
measures itself manifests negligence. 
IV. SCHOOL DISTRICT RESPONSIBILITY FOR A TECHNOLOGY 
COMPANY’S NEGLIGENCE 
Separate from the issue of liability for a school district’s 
own negligence is the issue of a school district’s potential 
liability for a technology company’s negligence. For instance, 
a private company deploying an SMP may fail to notify a 
school about flagged incidents or fail to detect warning signs 
 
proteting-personal-information.pdf. The recommended practices are encrypting 
sensitive information stored on the computer network, checking software 
vendors’ websites for alerts about new vulnerabilities, using a firewall to protect 
a computer from hackers, setting access controls, requiring employees to use 
strong passwords, and implementing a breach response plan. Id. at 10, 13, 17, 22. 
Additionally, the Federal Communications Commission recommends use of web 
filtering, antivirus signature protection, proactive malware protection, firewalls, 
strong security policies, and employee training as a combination of techniques to 
lower the risk of security threats. FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, CYBER SECURITY 
PLANNING GUIDE, at SF-3 (2012), https://transition.fcc.gov/cyber/cyber 
planner.pdf. 
 142. In In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litigation, a number of lawsuits were 
filed against Anthem and Blue Cross Blue Shield Association after 
cyberattackers breached the Anthem database. 162 F. Supp. 3d 953, 965 (N.D. 
Cal. 2016). The Anthem database held members’ personal information, including 
individually identifiable health information. Id. at 966–67. In all, the Anthem 
database contained the personal identification information of approximately 80 
million individuals. Id. at 967. Plaintiffs alleged in part that Anthem and Blue 
Cross failed to protect the data systems adequately. Id. at 967–68. The court 
determined that defendants failed to take appropriate measures to protect their 
members, especially in light of available data security technology. 
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of potential risks of harm because of inadequate algorithms. 
In general, a school district would not be liable for any 
negligent act or omission by an independent contractor such 
as a technology company.143 There are, however, various 
exceptions to this general rule of non-liability. Although 
these exceptions can be numerous and vary significantly 
across jurisdictions, they broadly fall into three categories: 
the school district (1) was negligent in selecting, instructing, 
or supervising the technology company; (2) has a non-
delegable duty; or (3) hired a contractor to perform work that 
is inherently dangerous.144 Only the first two exceptions are 
relevant here.145 
Yet even when considering these exceptions, it is 
generally unlikely that school districts would be liable under 
existing law for a technology company’s negligence. First, 
courts would likely consider technology companies to be 
independent contractors. Second, it is unlikely that school 
districts would be liable for negligently selecting or 
supervising technology companies. Finally, it is also unlikely 
that courts would determine that a school’s duty to protect 
students is non-delegable. 
 
 143. See, e.g., Jacks v. Tipton Cmty. Sch. Corp., 94 N.E.3d 712, 719 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2018); see also McCurry v. Sch. Dist. of Valley, 496 N.W.2d 433, 439 (Neb. 
1993); Saiz v. Belen Sch. Dist., 827 P.2d 102, 108 (N.M. 1992); Begley v. City of 
New York, 972 N.Y.S.2d 48, 66 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2013); Lofy v. Joint Sch. 
Dist. No. 2, 166 N.W.2d 809, 813 (Wis. 1969); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 409. 
 144. See McCurry, 496 N.W.2d at 439; see also Saiz, 827 P.2d at 108; Begley, 
972 N.Y.S.2d at 66; Lofy, 166 N.W.2d at 813; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 409. 
 145. For the third exception to apply, generally the contracted work itself must 
be inherently dangerous. See, e.g., Saiz, 827 P.2d at 110 (“[O]ne who employs an 
independent contractor to do work that the employer as a matter of law should 
recognize as likely to create a peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless 
reasonable precautions are taken is liable for physical harm to others caused by 
an absence of those precautions.”) (emphasis added); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 409. Administering SMPs itself does not create a peculiar 
risk of harm similar to other activities such as operating certain machinery or 
performing maintenance on high voltage electrical equipment. 
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A. Technology Companies as Independent Contractors 
A threshold inquiry is whether a technology company in 
this context is an independent contractor as opposed to a 
servant or an employee. The general rule of non-liability 
applies only if the contracting party is in fact an independent 
contractor instead of an employee.146 The test courts use to 
classify independent contractors as opposed to employees 
varies considerably across jurisdictions and is often a very 
fact-intensive inquiry.147 Courts typically balance numerous 
factors, none of which is determinative.148 The most 
important factor courts consider is that the independent 
contractor has the ability to control the method and means 
of the work while the employer may control the results of the 
work.149 There are also various other factors courts consider, 
such as the nature of the work, the degree of skill or expertise 
required, which party supplies the instrumentalities of the 
work, the length of time required to complete the work, the 
method of payment, and the parties’ intent in forming the 
relationship.150 
In the SMP context, courts likely would consider 
technology companies to be independent contractors. A 
school district’s role in administering SMPs is typically 
triggered only after a technology company notifies the school 
of a potential risk. Although schools may suggest phrases to 
monitor after considering the local slang and any particular 
school issues, the technology companies implement those 
 
 146. Smith v. Fall River Joint Union High Sch. Dist., 5 P.2d 930, 933 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1931). 
 147. E.g., McCurry, 496 N.W.2d at 439; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 409. 
 148. E.g., McCurry, 496 N.W.2d at 439. 
 149. Id.; see also Smith, 5 P.2d at 933 (determining a school bus driver was not 
an independent contractor where the school could terminate the contract at will 
because “[b]y retaining the power of discharge the district was virtually in a 
position to control every act of the driver”). 
 150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409; see also 41 AM. JUR. 2D 
Independent Contractors §§ 1, 5 (2015). 
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suggestions. And, while school districts may provide 
students the devices and accounts that technology companies 
monitor, technology companies design and implement the 
SMP programs and algorithms and may also own intellectual 
property rights related to the SMP. Moreover, technology 
companies typically contract with numerous school districts 
to provide the same or similar services. Thus, courts would 
likely consider technology companies administering SMPs to 
be independent contractors, which would generally insulate 
school districts from liability for a technology company’s 
negligence. 
However, schools should still recognize that the general 
rule of non-liability applies only for an independent 
contractor’s negligence.151 Schools may still be liable for their 
own negligence even if an independent contractor 
relationship exists. School districts may still make certain 
decisions in administering SMPs, such as deciding which 
phrases to monitor and flag, when and how to notify parents 
and interested parties of incidents, or how to handle 
investigations.152 As previously discussed, a school district’s 
liability for this type of conduct depends on the applicable 
law regarding immunity and the school’s duty to protect.153 
Therefore, while courts are likely to characterize technology 
companies as independent contractors, school districts 
should still take special consideration as to how their own 
potential negligence may prompt liability.154 
 
 151. McCurry, 496 N.W.2d at 439. 
 152. See supra Part I. 
 153. See supra Parts II–III. For example, in negligence cases involving school-
provided transportation, jurisdictions differ on how immunity applies when 
school officials designate bus stops and design bus routes. Some jurisdictions 
categorize these decisions as operational decisions and others categorize them as 
discretionary or policy-implementing decisions. Compare Warrington v. Tempe 
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 3, 928 P.2d 673, 677 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1st Div. 1996) 
(determining sovereign immunity does not apply), with McNees v. Scholley, 208 
N.W.2d 643, 646 (Mich. App. Ct. 3d Div. 1973) (determining sovereign immunity 
applies). 
 154. See supra Part III. 
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B. School District Liability for Negligently Selecting, 
Instructing, or Supervising Technology Companies 
Even where an independent contractor relationship 
exists, the employer may still be liable for negligently 
selecting, instructing, or supervising the contractor.155 First, 
if a contractor turns out to be incompetent, an employer can 
be liable for failing to use reasonable care in selecting the 
contractor to perform a duty the employer owes to a third 
person.156 The Restatement (Second) of Torts describes a 
competent contractor as one “who possesses the knowledge, 
skill, experience, and available equipment which a 
reasonable man would realize that a contractor must have in 
order to do the work which he is employed to do without 
creating unreasonable risk of injury to others[.]”157 The 
amount of care required in selecting a contractor depends on 
factors such as the risk of harm from negligently completing 
the work, the expertise required to complete the work, and 
the relationship of the parties that creates the employer’s 
duty owed to the other party.158 Second, an employer can be 
liable for negligently instructing, inspecting the work of, or 
supervising an independent contractor.159 This is often 
applicable in the premises liability context where, for 
example, a school may be liable for failing to inspect the work 
of an independent contractor who designed and built an 
addition to the school.160 
A school district’s liability for negligently selecting, 
instructing, or supervising an independent contractor is 
particularly relevant when schools delegate supervision of 
 
 155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 411–14. 
 156. Settles v. Inc. Vill. of Freeport, 503 N.Y.S.2d 945, 948 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986); 
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 411. 
 157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 411. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Williams v. Cent. Consol. Sch. Dist., 952 P.2d 978, 982 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1997); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 412–14. 
 160. See Williams, 952 P.2d at 983. 
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students. Yet this exception to the general rule of non-
liability is merely an extension of the school’s own 
negligence, meaning the school’s negligence must still be the 
proximate cause of the harm producing the plaintiff’s 
injury.161 For example, in Greening by Greening v. School 
District of Millard, a disabled student sued the school district 
after injuring his leg in a physical therapy program run 
through the school.162 A licensed physical therapist designed 
the student’s physical therapy program but later delegated 
supervision of the student’s exercises to a school employee, 
who was not a licensed physical therapist.163 The Nebraska 
Supreme Court held that the school was not liable for 
permitting the unqualified employee to oversee the student’s 
exercise program because there was no evidence suggesting 
that the incompetent employee’s conduct proximately caused 
the injury.164 The court stated that, if an undue risk of harm 
“exists because of the quality of the employee, there is 
liability only to the extent that the harm is caused by the 
quality of the employee which the employer had reason to 
suppose would be likely to cause harm.”165 
In the SMP context, a school district’s liability for 
negligently selecting, instructing, or supervising a 
technology company can also be a fact-intensive inquiry and 
vary across jurisdictions based on the parties’ relationship. 
A school may be liable if it fails to perform diligence in 
selecting an SMP provider. Due diligence may include 
checking the technology company’s credentials and ability to 
perform what the company advertises. Schools should also 
diligently instruct and supervise technology companies. This 
can include instructing companies on the best phrases to flag 
 
 161. Greening v. Sch. Dist. of Millard, 393 N.W.2d 51, 57-58 (Neb. 1986). 
 162. Id. at 55–56. 
 163. Id. at 55. 
 164. Id. at 57–58. 
 165. Id. at 58 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1958)). 
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depending on the schools’ specific issues.166 However, even if 
a school district negligently selected, instructed, or 
supervised a technology company, the school’s negligence 
must still be the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. 
Because of this limitation, it is less likely that a school 
district would be liable under this exception.167 Even so, 
school districts should still carefully consider a technology 
company’s qualifications and should take adequate 
precautions when administering SMPs. 
C. Delegating a School’s Duty to Protect Students 
Employers have also been liable for an independent 
contractor’s negligence where the employer hired the 
contractor to perform a non-delegable duty.168 A non-
delegable duty can arise by common law or by statute, but is 
typically deemed “so vital or important to the community 
that the employer should not be permitted to transfer or 
delegate it to an independent contractor.”169 Courts often 
broadly apply exceptions to the general rule of non-liability, 
relying on numerous different exceptions and allowing 
considerable overlap in how to formulate each exception.170 
And, because school districts only recently began to use 
SMPs, there is little controlling case law on whether a 
school’s duty to protect is delegable. Accordingly, this section 
describes how courts have applied the non-delegable duty 
exception to various school duties of care arising by common 
 
 166. For instance, a school should instruct a technology company to monitor 
for a phrase if the school is aware of an issue with a particular type of drug at the 
school that students may commonly refer to by a local slang term. This concept 
is discussed in greater detail supra Part III. 
 167. See, e.g., Greening, 398 N.W.2d at 58. 
 168. See, e.g., Carabba v. Anacortes Sch. Dist. No. 103, 435 P.2d 936, 948 
(Wash. 1967). 
 169. Richard. J. Hunter, Jr., An “Insider’s” Guide to the Legal Liability of 
Sports Contest Officials, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 369, 409 (2005); see also Jacks 
v. Tipton Cmty. Sch. Corp., 94 N.E.3d 712, 719 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).  
 170. Saiz v. Belen Sch. Dist., 827 P.2d 102, 109 (N.M. 1992); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409. 
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law and then by statute, concluding that courts are unlikely 
to determine that a school’s duty to protect is non-
delegable.171 
1. Delegating a School’s Common Law Duty to Protect 
Most relevant to this inquiry is how courts have applied 
the non-delegable duty exception to schools’ common law 
duty to protect, and courts have adopted contrasting 
approaches.172 At least one court has determined that a 
school’s duty to protect is non-delegable. In Carabba v. 
Anacortes School District Number 103,173 the student body 
associations of two schools jointly sponsored a wrestling meet 
and employed a referee from an independent high school 
wrestling association to monitor the matches. During one 
match, a student became paralyzed after being put in a full 
nelson (an illegal wrestling move) while the referee was 
distracted.174 The Washington Supreme Court first 
determined that the schools were liable for the student body 
associations’ conduct because the schools tightly controlled 
the associations and the wrestling meet was “under the 
 
 171. For an argument that schools should have a non-delegable duty to provide 
an equal educational opportunity based on a sexual harassment theory, see Ivan 
E. Bodensteiner, Peer Harassment-Interference with an Equal Educational 
Opportunity in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 79 NEB. L. REV. 1, 40–41 
(2000). 
 172. Compare Kennel v. Carson City Sch. Dist., 738 F. Supp. 376, 379 (D. Nev. 
1990) (holding a school’s duty to protect is delegable), with Carabba, 435 P.2d at 
948 (holding a school’s duty to protect is non-delegable). It is also worth noting 
that this analysis is relevant only where technology companies contract directly 
with the school district and not with a separate entity, such as a state agency. 
See Greening, 393 N.W.2d at 57 (declining to determine whether a school’s duty 
to protect was delegable where the state, not school district, employed an 
independent contractor to supervise student). A school district may be further 
insulated from a technology company’s negligence where the technology company 
contracts with and operates under the direction of a state agency instead of 
directly with the school district. However, this type of engagement does not 
appear to be the current industry trend. See supra Section I. 
 173. 435 P.2d at 939. 
 174. Id. 
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auspices” of the school districts.175 Further, the court ruled 
that the schools could be liable for negligent supervision even 
though they employed the referee, an independent 
contractor, to monitor the wrestling match.176 In so holding, 
the court stated that a party’s duty of care to protect a third 
party is non-delegable and “satisfied if, and only if, the 
person to whom the work of protection is delegated is careful 
in giving the protection.”177 
In the SMP context, however, it appears generally 
unlikely that Carabba would control how courts would apply 
the non-delegable duty exception. At least one court has 
declined to follow Carabba and has instead held that a 
school’s duty to protect is delegable.178 As discussed in detail 
above, an employer’s liability for negligence of an 
independent contractor and employee alike is based on the 
concept of control, which Carabba does not consider at 
length.179 Rules on classifying an independent contractor and 
the doctrine of respondeat superior are both based on the 
employer’s right and ability to control the agent’s work.180 
Yet, schools exert little control over how technology 
companies design and administer SMPs.181 As a result, even 
if courts extend a school’s common law duty to protect based 
on how SMPs change a school’s custodial nature, it is still 
generally unlikely that courts would determine that a 
school’s duty to protect is non-delegable. 
  
 
 175. Id. at 947. 
 176. Id. at 948. 
 177. Id. at 947–48 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 214). 
 178. Kennel v. Carson City Sch. Dist., 738 F. Supp. 376, 379 (D. Nev. 1990). 
 179. Id.; see also Smith v. Fall River Joint Union High Sch. Dist., 5 P.2d 930, 
933 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931); McCurry v. Sch. Dist. Of Valley, 496 N.W.2d 433, 
439 (Neb. 1993). 
 180. Kennel, 738 F. Supp. at 379. 
 181. See supra Part I. 
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2. Delegating a School’s Statutory Duty of Care 
Although schools’ duty to protect has historically been a 
result of the common law, several statutes also impose 
specific duties of care schools owe students. These statutes 
can take a variety of forms. For example, many states have 
recently enacted legislation regulating how schools must 
prevent, mitigate, and respond to incidents of bullying 
(including cyberbullying).182 Other laws may require schools 
to implement programs for certain classes of students, such 
as disabled students.183 Moreover, several states extensively 
regulate safe transportation by schools (which, as with 
administering SMPs, schools commonly contract this duty 
out to independent bus companies).184 Even though these 
statutory duties may vary in subject matter and 
construction, courts have commonly determined that these 
duties are delegable. While school districts should consult 
their jurisdiction’s laws, it is unlikely in general that courts 
will hold schools liable for a technology company’s negligence 
based on a non-delegable statutory duty to protect. 
First, many, if not all, states have comprehensive 
regulations requiring schools to adopt anti-bullying 
policies.185 Schools’ anti-bullying policies often must include 
policies on preventing, mitigating, investigating, and 
notifying interested parties about bullying, including 
cyberbullying.186 A school’s statutory anti-bullying 
responsibilities are dependent on the statutory language 
 
 182. For a summary and comparison of each jurisdiction’s laws and policies 
regarding bullying and cyberbullying, see Laws, Policies & Regulations, 
STOPBULLYING.GOV (Jan. 7, 2018), https://www.stopbullying.gov/laws/index 
.html#1. 
 183. See, e.g., Begley v. City of New York, 972 N.Y.S.2d 48, 90 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2d Dep’t 2013) (discussing the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 
U.S.C. §§ 1400–09 (2010)). 
 184. See, e.g., Lofy v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 106 N.W.2d 809, 811–12 (Wis. 1969) 
(describing Wisconsin’s previous regulatory scheme for school transportation). 
 185. See Laws, Policies & Regulations, supra note 182. 
 186. Id. 
2019] AI GOES TO SCHOOL 1367 
and, thus, can vary considerably across jurisdictions.187 Yet 
even where states have adopted statutory anti-bullying 
policies for schools, courts have often declined to hold schools 
liable for failing to follow these policies, let alone determine 
that any statutory anti-bullying duty is non-delegable.188 
This trend is likely due to how courts often narrowly 
interpret the statutory duties, particularly in light of the 
school’s limited common law duty to address bullying 
(especially outside of school premises).189 
In similar vein, courts have also determined that other 
specific statutory duties of care are delegable. For instance, 
a New York court has held that a public school could delegate 
supervision to a private school and a contracted school nurse 
where a statute required schools to provide programs and 
services for disabled students.190 The court held that the 
public school was not liable where the private school had 
primary custody and, hence, supervision of the disabled 
student.191 And, even after considering the “importance of 
ensuring that children who require nursing services to 
attend school receive such services from competent 
professionals,” the court reasoned that providing nursing 
 
 187. See, e.g., Gauthier v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 123 A.3d 1016, 1021 (N.H. 
2015) (holding a school did not breach a statutory anti-bullying duty where the 
statute did not create a private cause of action and the school did not have a 
distinct common law duty to intervene). 
 188. See, e.g., Castillo v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 103 N.E.3d 596, 599–600 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2018) (holding Illinois’s bullying-prevention statute only 
requires school districts to craft an anti-bullying policy, not to respond to bullying 
incidents in any precise manner); see also Mulvey v. Carl Sandburg High Sch., 66 
N.E.3d 507, 514 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2016) (holding a school district’s statutorily 
required anti-bullying policy did not create a cause of action against the school 
where the policy stated merely a general anti-bullying goal and did not promise 
any particular result or action in response to bullying incidents). 
 189. See, e.g., Stephenson v. City of New York, 978 N.E. 1251, 1253–54 (“There 
is no statutory duty to inform parents about generalized threats made at school, 
and the circumstances here do not give rise to a common-law duty to notify 
parents about threatened harm posed by a third party.”). 
 190. Begley v. City of New York, 972 N.Y.S.2d 48, 67 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 
2013). 
 191. Id. at 65. 
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services is not “so integral” to the school’s “core responsibility 
of educating children that, as a matter of public policy, it can 
be deemed a nondelegable duty[.]”192 Thus, even though the 
statute mandated detailed responsibilities to schools for 
specific students, the court determined that those 
responsibilities were delegable to both the private school and 
the contractor-nurse.193 
Finally, courts have also construed a school’s statutory 
responsibility to provide reasonably safe transportation as 
delegable. As one court has stated, a “plaintiff is under a 
burden to demonstrate something more than the fact” that a 
statute requires schools to safely transport students to and 
from school for a school to be liable for an independent 
contractor’s negligence.194 Courts often will not construe a 
school’s transportation responsibilities as non-delegable 
unless an accompanying common law duty or specific 
statutory provision imposes strict liability on schools for 
providing school transportation.195 But state laws regulating 
school transportation rarely impose strict liability on schools 
to ensure that students are safely transported to and from 
school, even if an independent contractor provides the 
transportation.196 As a result, courts are often hesitant to 
frame these duties as non-delegable. 
In sum, because courts have been reluctant to interpret 
schools’ statutory duties of care as non-delegable, it is 
 
 192. Id. at 67. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Settles v. Inc. Vill. of Freeport, 503 N.Y.S.2d 945, 949 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986). 
 195. See id. at 948–49.  
 196. See, e.g., Chainani v. Bd. of Educ. of New York, 663 N.E.2d 283, 285 (N.Y. 
1995) (holding a school district is not liable for a contracted bus driver’s 
negligence where the school had no duty to ensure the driver complied with the 
school bus safety regulations); see also Lofy v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 166 N.W.2d 
809, 814 (Wis. 1969) (holding a school’s negligence liability for providing school 
transportation is delegable where the statute afforded schools discretion in 
whether to provide transportation and a provision permitted claims against the 
state without mentioning claims against an independent contractor). 
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unlikely that courts would do so within the SMP context. A 
school’s duty to protect is likely delegable so long as there are 
no statutory provisions imposing either strict liability or a 
specific non-delegable duty to protect. Even if SMPs broaden 
schools’ custodial nature, courts would likely still be 
reluctant to categorize this duty as non-delegable because 
schools exert little control over technology companies. And, 
although supervising students is an integral aspect to 
education, schools contracting with technology companies to 
administer SMPs augment rather than abdicate a duty to 
protect. SMPs enhance rather than merely delegate schools’ 
supervisory capacities. A school’s liability naturally depends 
on a jurisdiction’s specific laws. But, overall, courts are 
generally unlikely to hold school districts liable for a 
technology company’s negligence in administering SMPs. 
CONCLUSION 
Technology can enhance a school district’s effort to 
protect its students from harm. Although it is too early to 
tell, SMPs hold great promise in preventing bullying and 
facilitating early intervention in cases of suicidal tendencies. 
Adoption of an SMP outsources a school’s duty to protect in 
part to an outside technology company. 
That contracting out likely will shift a school district’s 
potential liability in several ways. First, school districts that 
follow through on alerts indicated by the SMP should be 
protected from liability for any harm that nonetheless 
ensues. Second, any school district that ignores an SMP alert 
may be liable if harm follows, even outside of school 
premises, because utilization of an SMP increases the 
geographic scope of a school’s duty. Third, school districts 
must take steps to prevent adoption of the SMP as an 
affirmative act from dampening the vigilance of parents in 
protecting their own children, lest schools be liable for any 
negligence stemming from mistakes in setting up SMP filters 
or in carrying out SMP warnings. Fourth, if SMPs prove as 
reliable as advertised, school districts in the future may face 
1370 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  67 
liability for not utilizing such technology to protect their 
students. And, finally, schools should take care not to ignore 
signs of their technology contractors’ negligence. SMPs 
protect students and, to some extent, schools, but schools 
need take care lest their adoption of an SMP leads parents 
and courts to conclude that, in walking down that path, 
schools have become the insurer of student safety. 
 
